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Abstract
Noninterference requires that there is no information
flow from sensitive to public data in a given system. However, many systems perform intentional release of sensitive
information as part of their correct functioning and therefore violate noninterference. To control information flow
while permitting intentional information release, some systems have a downgrading or declassification mechanism.
A major danger of such a mechanism is that it may cause
unintentional information release. This paper shows that a
robustness property can be used to characterize programs
in which declassification mechanisms cannot be exploited
by attackers to release more information than intended. It
describes a simple way to provably enforce this robustness
property through a type-based compile-time program analysis. The paper also presents a generalization of robustness
that supports upgrading (endorsing) data integrity.

1. Introduction
Information ﬂow controls have some appealing properties as a security enforcement mechanism. Unlike access
controls, they track the propagation of information and prevent sensitive information from being released publicly, regardless of how information is transformed by the system.
Dually, information ﬂow controls may be used to enforce
data integrity. One common formal underpinning of these
mechanisms is the noninterference security property [16],
which imposes an end-to-end requirement on the behavior
of the system: sensitive data cannot affect public data. However, in practice noninterference is too strong; real systems
∗
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leak some amount of sensitive information as part of their
proper functioning.
One way to accommodate information release is to allow
explicit downgrading or declassiﬁcation of sensitive information (e.g., [13, 24, 5]). These mechanisms are inherently
unsafe and there is the possibility that a downgrading channel that is part of a larger system may be exploited to release information in a way that was not intended.
Given that noninterference is not satisﬁed, we would like
to know that the information release occurs in accordance
with some presumably more ﬂexible security policy. However, it seems to be difﬁcult in general to express these policies precisely and even more difﬁcult to show that systems
satisfy them. Therefore a reasonable strategy is instead to
identify and enforce important aspects of the intended security policy rather than trying to express and enforce the
entire policy.
A recent example of this approach is robust declassification, a security property deﬁned by Zdancewic and Myers [43]. The intuition is that although the system may release information, an attacker should have no control over
what information is released. More generally, in a system
that is separated into untrusted and trusted components, the
untrusted components should not be able to affect information release. Zdancewic and Myers captured this idea formally in the context of a state transition system, but offered
no practical way to analyze whether a program satisﬁed robust declassiﬁcation.
This paper generalizes the previous work on robustness
in three ways. First, it shows how to express the property
in a language-based setting; speciﬁcally, for a simple imperative programming language. Second, it generalizes the
property so that—unlike the earlier robustness property—
untrusted code and data are explicitly part of the system
rather than appearing only when there is an active attacker.
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Third, it introduces a security guarantee called qualified robustness that provides untrusted code with a limited ability
to affect information release.
The key technical result of the paper is a demonstration that both robustness and qualiﬁed robustness can be
enforced by a compile-time program analysis based on a
simple type system. A type system is given that tracks
data conﬁdentiality and integrity in the imperative programming language, similarly to the type system deﬁned by
Zdancewic [42]. This paper also takes the new step of proving that all well-typed programs satisfy the language-based
robustness condition it deﬁnes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
presents some of the basic assumptions and models used
for this work, including a simple imperative language with
an explicit declassiﬁcation construct that downgrades conﬁdentiality levels. Section 3 presents and generalizes the robustness condition in this language-based setting, and gives
some motivating code fragments that are used as running
examples. Section 4 presents a security type system for the
imperative language. This type system tracks both the conﬁdentiality and integrity of data and imposes integrity requirements on declassiﬁcation operations. It also ensures
that any well-typed program satisﬁes the robust declassiﬁcation condition. Section 5 presents more detailed examples
and shows how the robust declassiﬁcation condition gives
insight into program security. Section 6 generalizes the robust declassiﬁcation condition to allow untrusted code limited control over information release, and shows that useful
code examples satisfy this limited robustness property. Section 7 discusses related work, and Section 8 concludes.

2. Language and attacker model
2.1. Security lattice
We assume that the security levels form a security lattice L. The ordering speciﬁes the relationship between different security levels. To enable reasoning about both conﬁdentiality and integrity, the security lattice L is a product of
confidentiality and integrity lattices, L C and LI , with orderings C and I , respectively. If C C C  (I I I  ) then
data at level C (I) is no more conﬁdential (no less trustworthy) than data at level C  (I  ). An element  of the product lattice is a pair (C(), I()) (which we sometimes write
as C()I() for brevity), where we denote the conﬁdentiality and integrity parts of  by C() and I(), respectively.
The ordering on L, LC , and LI corresponds to the restrictions on how data at a given security level can be used. The
use of high-conﬁdentiality data is more restricted than that
of low-conﬁdentiality data, which helps prevent information leaks. Dually, the use of low-integrity data is more re-

HL

HH

LL

LH
Figure 1. Security lattice LLH .
stricted than that of high-integrity data, which helps prevent
information corruption.
An example LLH of a security lattice is displayed in Figure 1. This lattice is a product of a simple conﬁdentiality lattice (with elements L and H of low and high conﬁdentiality so that L C H) and a dual integrity lattice (with elements L and H of low and high integrity so that H I L).
At the bottom of the lattice is the level LH for data that
may be used arbitrarily. This data has the lowest conﬁdentiality and highest integrity level. At the top of the lattice is
the data that is most restrictive in usage. This data has the
highest conﬁdentiality and lowest integrity level.

2.2. Attacker model
The goal of this paper is to characterize programs in
which untrusted components cannot improperly affect what
information is released. These untrusted components are assumed to be under the control of some attacker. This is
a very general model of the system. This attacker may in
fact be an ordinary user, in which case the goal is to understand whether program users can cause unintended information release, perhaps by providing unexpected inputs.
Alternatively, as in the work on secure program partitioning [45, 46], the system might be a distributed program in
which some of the program code runs on untrusted hosts
and is assumed to be controlled by a malicious attacker.
In all these scenarios, the attacker is described by a conﬁdentiality level CA representing the conﬁdentiality of data
the attacker is expected to be able to read, and an integrity
level IA deﬁning the integrity of data that the attacker is expected to be able to affect. Thus, the robustness of a system is with respect to the attacker parameters (CA , IA ). As
far as a given attacker is concerned, the four-point lattice
LLH captures the relevant features of the general lattice L.
Let us deﬁne high- and low-conﬁdentiality areas of L by
HC = { | C()  CA } and LC = { | C()  CA }, re-
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Attacker can modify
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Figure 2. Attacker’s view of a general lattice.
spectively. Similarly, we deﬁne low- and high-integrity areas by LI = { | IA  I()} and HI = { | IA  I()},
respectively. The four key areas of lattice L correspond exactly to the four points of lattice LLH :
LH ∼ LC ∩ HI
LL ∼ LC ∩ LI

HH ∼ HC ∩ HI
HL ∼ HC ∩ LI

This correspondence is illustrated in Figure 2. From the attacker’s point of view, area LH describes data that is visible
but cannot be modiﬁed; area HH describes data that is not
visible and cannot be modiﬁed; area LL describes data that
is both visible and can be modiﬁed; and, ﬁnally, area HL describes data that is not visible but can be modiﬁed by the attacker. Because of this correspondence between LLH and
L, results obtained for the lattice LLH generalize naturally
to the full lattice L.

2.3. Language
This paper uses a simple sequential language consisting
of expressions and commands. It is similar to several other
security-typed imperative languages (e.g., [40, 2]), and its
semantics are largely standard (cf. [41]).
Definition 1. The language syntax is defined by the following grammar:
e ::= val | v | e1 op e2 | declassify(e, )
c ::= skip | v := e | c1 ; c2
| if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c
where val ranges over values Val = {false, true, 0, 1, . . . },
v ranges over variables Var , op ranges over arithmetic and
boolean operations on expressions, and  ranges over the
security levels.
The security environment Γ : Var → L describes the
type of each program variable as a security level. The security lattice and security environment together constitute

a security policy, specifying that information ﬂow from a
variable v1 to a variable v2 is allowed only if Γ(v1 ) 
Γ(v2 ).
The only non-standard language expression is the construct declassify(e, ), which declassifies the security
level of the expression e to the level  ∈ L. Operationally,
the result of declassify(e, ) is the same as that of e regardless of . The intention is that declassiﬁcation is used
for controlling the security level of information without affecting the execution of the program.
The evaluation semantics are deﬁned in terms of smallstep transitions between conﬁgurations. A conﬁguration
M, c consists of a memory M (which is a ﬁnite mapping M : Var → Val from variables to values) and a
command (or expression) c. A transition from conﬁguration
M, c to conﬁguration M  , c  is denoted by M, c −→
M  , c . A transition from conﬁguration M, c to a terminating conﬁguration with memory M  is denoted by
M, c −→ M  . As usual, −→∗ is the reﬂexive and transitive closure of −→. Conﬁguration M, c terminates in
M  if M, c −→∗ M  , which is denoted by M, c ⇓ M 
or, simply, M, c ⇓ when M  is unimportant. If there is an
inﬁnitely long sequence of transitions from the initial conﬁguration M, c then that conﬁguration diverges, written
M, c ⇑. We assume that operations used in expressions
are total, and, hence, expression conﬁgurations always terminate (while command conﬁgurations might diverge). The
trace Tr (M, c) of the execution of conﬁguration M, c is
the sequence [M, M  , M  , . . . ] of memories extracted from
the sequence of conﬁgurations M, c −→ M  , c  −→
M  , c  −→ . . . . Similarly to conﬁgurations, a trace t terminates (in M ), written t ⇓ (t ⇓ M ) when t is ﬁnite (and
the last memory in t is M ); t diverges, written t ⇑, if t is inﬁnite.

3. Robustness condition
A common way of specifying conﬁdentiality is as noninterference [16], a security property that says that inputs of high conﬁdentiality do not affect outputs of lower
conﬁdentiality. Recent work on language-based security
(e.g., [40, 1, 17, 36, 38, 2, 34, 28, 35, 44, 3, 29]) has used
various deﬁnitions of noninterference as the deﬁnition of security. However, noninterference cannot characterize the security of a program designed to declassify conﬁdential information as part of its proper functioning. Therefore we
propose a security condition that captures important aspects
of the information release policy. This security condition
is based on robust declassiﬁcation [43], which intuitively
states that declassiﬁcation may not be abused by the attacker
to gain more knowledge about secrets than intended. In Section 6, we also consider how endorsement (a dual primitive
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that upgrades the integrity of data) affects the security characterization.
Let us deﬁne the view of the memory at level . The
idea is that the observer at level  may only distinguish
data whose security level is at or below . Formally, memories M1 and M2 are indistinguishable at a level  (written M1 = M2 ) if ∀v. Γ(v)   =⇒ M1 (v) = M2 (v).
The restriction M | of memory M to the security level 
is deﬁned by restricting the mapping to variables whose security level is at or below . Deﬁne the projection t| of
trace t to the security level  by the trace consisting of the
sequence of memories restricted to variables at or below
. Formally, [M1 , . . . , Mn , . . . ]| = [M1 | , . . . , Mn | . . . ].
Because computation steps can be observed only if they
make changes to the observable part of memory, we identify
traces up to high-stuttering with respect to a security level
. Traces t1 and t2 for conﬁgurations M1 , c1  and M2 , c2 
are related (t1 ∼ t2 ) if M1 = M2 and the subsequences
(of t1 and t2 ) of memories resulting from -observable assignments in c1 and c2 are -indistinguishable. Two traces
t1 and t2 are indistinguishable up to  (written t 1 ≈ t2 ) if
whenever both t1 and t2 terminate then t1 ∼ t2 . We lift indistinguishability from memories and traces to conﬁgurations by the following deﬁnition:
Definition 2. Two configurations M 1 , c1  and M2 , c2 
are weakly indistinguishable up to  (written M1 , c1  ≈
M2 , c2 ) if Tr (M1 , c1 ) ≈ Tr (M2 , c2 ). We say that
two configurations are strongly indistinguishable up to 
(written M1 , c1   M2 , c2 ) if M1 , c1  ⇓, M2 , c2  ⇓,
and M1 , c1  ≈ M2 , c2 .
Note that weak indistinguishability is timing- and
termination-insensitive because it allows one trace to end
prematurely; strong indistinguishability requires the termination of both conﬁgurations so that the traces remain
related throughout their entire execution.
Noninterference says that if two memories are indistinguishable at a certain level, then the executions of a given
program on these two memories are also (at least weakly)
indistinguishable at that level:
Definition 3 (Noninterference). A command c satisfies
noninterference under Γ if
∀, M1 , M2 . M1 = M2 =⇒ M1 , c ≈ M2 , c
Because noninterference ﬂatly rejects dependencies at
any security level, it is overly restrictive for many systems.
(However, it is still useful for reasoning about fragments
of a larger program.) As described by Zdancewic and Myers [43], robust declassiﬁcation ensures that declassiﬁcation
cannot be abused by the attacker. More precisely, a system
is secure if an active attacker (who can observe and modify
a part of the system state) may not learn more sensitive information than a passive attacker (who can merely observe

visible data). Here we model both kinds of attackers relative to a point A in a security lattice. A passive A-attacker
may read data at or below CA (i.e., at or below (CA , I ) in
the product lattice) whereas an active A-attacker may modify data at or above IA (i.e., at or above (⊥C , IA ) in the
product lattice). In general, an attacker may run any program satisfying a combination of conditions on what data
can be read and modiﬁed. We call such programs fair attacks.
Definition 4. A command a is a fair attack if it is formed
according to the following grammar (for some  ∈ LL):
a ::= skip
| v := e (∀x ∈ Vars(e). Γ(x) =  = Γ(v)) | a1 ; a2
| if b then a1 else a2 (∀x ∈ Vars(b). Γ(x) = )
| while b do a (∀x ∈ Vars(b). Γ(x) = )
Attacker-controlled low-integrity computation may be
interspersed with high-integrity code. To distinguish the
two, the high-integrity code is represented as a program in
which some statements are missing, replaced by holes (•).
The idea is that the holes are places where the attacker can
insert arbitrary low-integrity code. There may be multiple
holes in the high-integrity code, represented by the notation •. The high-integrity computation is then a context c[•]
in which the holes can be replaced by a vector of attacker
code fragments, a to obtain a complete program c[a]. An attack is thus a vector of such code fragments.
Although the assumption that attackers are constrained
to interpolating sequential code may seem artiﬁcial, it is
a reasonable assumption to make both in a single-machine
setting where the attacker’s code can be statically checked
before it is run, and in a distributed setting where the attacker has complete power to change the untrusted code,
but where that code is limited in its ability to affect the machines on which trusted code is run [45].
High-integrity contexts are deﬁned formally as follows:
Definition 5. High-integrity contexts, or commands with
holes, c[•] are defined by extending the command grammar
from Definition 1 with:
c[•] ::= . . . | [•]
Using this deﬁnition, robust declassiﬁcation can be translated into the language-based setting. Robust declassiﬁcation holds if for all a, whenever program c[a] cannot distinguish the behaviors of the program on some memories,
then any change of the attacker’s code to any other attack
a still cannot distinguish the behaviors of the program on
these memories. In other words, the attacker’s observations
about c[a ] may not reveal any secrets apart from what the
attacker already knows from observations about c[a]. This
is formally expressed in the following deﬁnition.
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Definition 6 (Robustness). Command c[•] has robustness
with respect to fair attacks if

HL
CA

∀M1 , M2 , a, a . M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] =⇒
M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ]
As noted, the attacker can observe data below the lattice
point (CA , I ). This level is used for the relations A
and ≈A , requiring equality for the low-conﬁdentiality parts
of memories and conﬁgurations, respectively. Note that
M1 , c A M2 , c implies that M1 =A M2 by Deﬁnition 2.
The deﬁnition of robustness uses both strong and weak
indistinguishability, which is needed to deal properly with
nontermination. Because we are ignoring timing and termination channels, information is only really leaked if conﬁgurations are not weakly indistinguishable. However, the
premise of the condition is based on strong indistinguishability because a sufﬁciently incompetent attacker may insert nonterminating code and thus make fewer observations
than even a passive attacker who inserts skip into every
hole. We are not concerned with such attackers.
Note that the robustness deﬁnition quantiﬁes over both
passive and active attacks. This is because neither passive
or active attacker behavior is known a priori. The vector of
skip commands is an example of a possible attack. Importantly, the robustness deﬁnition also guards against other attacks (which might affect what critical fragments of the target program are reachable). For example, under lattice LLH
and attacker at LL, consider the following program (here
and in the rest of the paper the subscript of a variable indicates its security level):

HH

Flow origins
Flow destinations

LL

l'

IA

LH

Figure 3. Effects of declassiﬁcation.
For example, under lattice LLH and attacker at LL, consider programs:
[•]; xLH := declassify(yHH , LH )
and
[•]; if xLH then yLH := declassify(zHH , LH )
else skip
No matter what (terminating attack) ﬁlls the hole, these programs are rejected by noninterference although their declassiﬁcation operations are intended. On the other hand, these
programs have robustness because the attacker may not inﬂuence what is declassiﬁed (by assigning to yHH in the former program) or by manipulating the control ﬂow leading
to declassiﬁcation (by assigning to xLH in the latter program). Indeed, no fair attack ﬁlling the hole may assign to
either yHH or xLH . However, the program

xLL := 1; [•]; while xLL > 0 do skip;
if xLL = 0 then yLH := declassify(zHH , LH )
else skip
This program would be robust if a in Deﬁnition 6 were ﬁxed
to be the skip command (as c[a] would always diverge).
However, the attacker may tamper with the declassiﬁcation
mechanism in the program because whether declassiﬁcation
code is reachable depends on the attacker-controlled variable xLL . This is indeed captured by Deﬁnition 6, which
deems the program as non-robust (take a = xLL := −1 and
a = xLL := 0).
The robustness deﬁnition ensures that the attacker’s actions cannot lead the declassiﬁcation mechanism to increase
the attacker’s observations about secrets. Note that robustness is really a property of a high-integrity program context
rather than of an entire program. A full program c[a] is robust if its high-integrity part c[•] is itself robust. Because
the low-integrity code a is assumed to be under the control of the attacker, the security property is insensitive to it.

l

[•]; if xLL then yLL := declassify(zHH , LH )
else skip
is rejected because the attacker might affect what is declassiﬁed or when it is declassiﬁed, by controlling the decision
variable xLL .

4. Security type system for robustness
Figure 4 gives typing rules for the simple sequential language. These are security typing rules because they impose
conditions on the security level components of type. As we
show later in this section, any program that is well-typed
according to these rules also satisﬁes the robustness property. We write Γ, pc  e :  to mean that an expression e has
type  under an environment Γ and a context pc. For commands, we write Γ, pc  c if command c is well-typed under an environment Γ and a context pc.
The typing rules control the information ﬂow due to assignments and control ﬂow in a largely standard fashion
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therefore with respect fair attacks.

Γ, pc  val : 

Definition 7. A command a is an A-attack under Γ if
Γ, (⊥C , IA )  a and declassify does not occur in a.

Γ(v) = 
Γ, pc  v : 
Γ, pc  e :  Γ, pc  e : 
Γ, pc  e op e : 
Γ, pc  e :  pc   pc
Γ, pc   e : 

  

Γ, pc  skip
Γ, pc  e :    pc  Γ(v)
Γ, pc  v := e
Γ, pc  c1 Γ, pc  c2
Γ, pc  c1 ; c2
Γ, pc  e :  Γ,   pc  c1 Γ,   pc  c2
Γ, pc  if e then c1 else c2

Under lattice LLH and A = LL, examples of attacks are programs xLL := yLL , while xHL do skip,
and (a harmless attack) skip. On the other hand, programs xHH := yLH and xLH := declassify(yLH , LH )
are not attacks as they manipulate high-integrity data.
Note that programs xLL := declassify(yHL , LL) and
if xLL then yLL := declassify(zHH, LH ) else skip
are not valid attacks because declassify may not be
used in attacks. This is consistent with the discipline enforced by the type system that the attacker may not
control declassiﬁcation. Recall the partition of data according to the conﬁdentiality (HC and LC ) and integrity (LI
and HI ) levels from Section 2.2. The following propositions provide some useful (and straightforward to prove)
properties of attacks.
Proposition 1. A fair attack is also an A-attack.

Γ, pc  e :  Γ,   pc  c
Γ, pc  while e do c

Proposition 2. An A-attack under Γ (i) does not have occurrences of assignments to high-integrity variables (such
v that Γ(v) ∈ HI ); and (ii) satisfies noninterference under Γ.

Γ, pc  c pc   pc
Γ, pc   c

The type system can be used to enforce two interesting
properties: noninterference (if declassify is not used) and
robust declassiﬁcation (even if it is).

Γ, pc  e : 
I() = I( )

  pc  Γ(v)
I(pc), I( ) ∈ HI

Γ, pc  v := declassify(e, )
Figure 4. Typing rules.
(cf. [40]). However, the key rule governing uses of declassiﬁcation is non-standard, though similar to that proposed by
Zdancewic [42] (we discuss the relation at the end of this
section). This rule states that only high-integrity data is allowed to be declassiﬁed and that declassiﬁcation might only
occur in a high-integrity context (pc). The effect of this rule
can be visualized by considering the lattice depicted in Figure 3. The ﬁgure includes an arrow corresponding to a declassiﬁcation from security level  to level  . Restricting the
area of possible ﬂow origins (below ) to the high-integrity
area of the lattice prevents the attacker (who controls the
low-integrity area of the lattice) from compromising the declassiﬁcation mechanism.
Using the type system, we deﬁne A-attacks, programs
controlled by the attacker at level A, which subsume fair attacks. We prove that well-typed programs are robust with
respect to A-attacks (or simply “attacks” from here on) and

Theorem 1. If Γ, pc  c and declassify does not occur
in c, then c satisfies noninterference.
This result is proved with a straightforward induction on the
evaluation of c [40].
The interesting question, however, is what the type system guarantees when declassiﬁcation is used. Observing
that declassiﬁcation affects only conﬁdentiality, we prove
that the integrity part of the noninterference property is preserved in the presence of declassiﬁcation:
Theorem 2. If Γ, pc  c then for all integrity levels I we
have
∀M1 , M2 . M1 =(C ,I) M2 =⇒ M1 , c ≈(C ,I) M2 , c
As for the conﬁdentiality part, we show the key result of
this paper: typable programs satisfy robust declassiﬁcation
and, thus, the attacker may not manipulate the declassiﬁcation mechanism to leak more information than intended.
For robustness it is important that holes not be placed
into high-conﬁdentiality environments. This is achieved by
deﬁning a suitable typing rule for holes:
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C(pc) ∈ LC
Γ, pc  •

This rule allows program contexts c[•] to be type-checked.
The robustness result is:
Theorem 3. If Γ, pc  c[•] then c[•] satisfies robust declassification.
The proof is found in Appendix A. It is a straightforward
induction on the structure of c[•].
It is worth clarifying the relation of the type system to
that deﬁned by Zdancewic [42]. While both type systems require high pc integrity in the typing rule for declassify,
the present system also requires high integrity of the expression to be declassiﬁed. The purpose of the latter requirement
is illustrated by the following example:
[•]; if xHL then yHL := zHL else yHL := vHL ;
wLL := declassify(yHL , LL)
This program is allowed by the typing rules presented by
Zdancewic [42]. However, the program clearly violates the
deﬁnition of robustness presented here. By requiring high
integrity of the declassiﬁed expression, the type system in
Figure 4 ensures that the program above is rejected.

match(pwdI , salt, pwd , hashR, matchR) checks whether
the password image pwdI matches the hash of the password pwd with the salt salt. It stores the result in the variable matchR. We assume that Cv and Iv denote the
conﬁdentiality C(Γ(v)) and integrity I(Γ(v)) of the variable v, respectively.
Γ, pc  hash(pwd , salt) :
Cpwd Ipwd × Csalt Isalt → Csalt I
= declassify(buildHash(pwd ||salt), Csalt I)
Γ, pc  match(pwdI , salt, pwd , hashR, matchR)
= hashR := hash(pwd , salt);
matchR := (pwdI == hashR)
where CmatchR = CpwdI  Csalt , ImatchR = IpwdI  I,
I = Ipwd  Isalt ; and I, I(pc) ∈ HI . As before, basic security types are written in the form CI (e.g., LH) where C
is the conﬁdentiality level and I is the integrity level. Let
us assume the lattice LLH from Figure 1 and A = LL. Instantiating the typings (and omitting the environment Γ) for
these functions shows that they capture the desired intuition:

5. Password checking example
This section applies robust declassiﬁcation to a program
that performs password checking, illustrating how the type
system gives security types to password-checking routines
and prevents attacks.
Password checking in general releases information about
passwords when attempts are made to log on. This is true
even when the login attempt is unsuccessful, because the
user learns that the password is not the password tried. A
password checker must therefore declassify the result of
password checking in order to report it to the user. The danger is that an attacker might exploit this login procedure by
encoding some other sensitive data as a password.
We consider UNIX-style password checking where the
system database stores the images (e.g., secure hashes) of
password-salt pairs. The salt is a publicly readable string
stored in the database for each user id, as a protection
against dictionary attacks. For a successful login, the user is
required to provide a query such that the hash of the string
and salt matches the image from the database.
Below are typed expressions/programs for computing the hash, matching the user input to the password
image from the database, and updating the password. Arrows in the types for expressions indicate that under
the types of the arguments on the left from the arrow, the type of the result is on the right from the arrow. The expression hash(pwd , salt) concatenates
the password pwd with the salt salt and applies the
one-way hash function buildHash to the concatenation (the latter is denoted by ||). The result is declassiﬁed to the level Csalt (where Csalt ∈ LC ). The command

The users apply hash to a password and salt:
LH  hash(pwd , salt) : HH × LH → LH
The users match a password to a password image:
LH  match(pwdI , salt, pwd , hashR, matchR) :
LH × LH × HH × LH × LH
Consider an attack that exploits declassiﬁcation in hash
and match in order to leak information about whether
xHH (Γ(xHH ) = HH ) equals yLL (Γ(yLL ) = LL):
[•]; match(hash(xHH , 0), 0, yLL, hashR, matchR);
if matchR then zLL := 1 else zLL := 0
This attack is rejected by the type system because lowintegrity data yLL is fed to match. Indeed, this attack compromises robustness. For example, take M1 and M2 such
that M1 (xHH ) = 2 and M2 (xHH ) = 3; a = yLL := 0;
and a = yLL := 2. We have M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] (the
else branch is taken regardless of xHH ) but M1 , c[a ] ≈A
M2 , c[a ] (which branch of the conditional is taken depends on the outcome of the match).
As a side note, this laundering attack is not defended
against in many approaches that are agnostic about the origin (or integrity) of data. For example, a typical intransitive
noninterference model accepts the attack as a secure program. Clearly, robust declassiﬁcation and intransitive noninterference capture different aspects of safe downgrading.
The process of updating passwords can also be modeled
as a typable program that satisﬁes robustness. We might deﬁne a procedure update to which the users must provide
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their old password in order to update to a new password:
Γ, pc  update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP, hashR, matchR)
= match(pwdI , salt, oldP , hashR, matchR);
if matchR
then pwdI := hash(newP , salt)
else skip
where Csalt (Isalt  IoldP  InewP )  CpwdI IpwdI and
Isalt , IoldP , InewP , I(pc) ∈ HI . In order for this code to
be well-typed, both the old password oldP and the new
password newP must be high-integrity variables; otherwise, hash would attempt to declassify low-integrity information newP (with the decision to declassify dependent on
low-integrity information oldP ), which the type system prevents. Thus, an attacker is prevented from using the password system to launder information. Instantiating this typing to the simple lattice LLH and A = LL is as follows:
The users modify a password:
LH  update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP , hR, mR) :
LH × LH × HH × HH × LH × LH

6. Endorsement and qualified robustness
Sometimes it makes sense to give untrusted code the
ability to affect what information is released by a program.
For example, consider an application that allows untrusted
users to select and purchase information. The information
provider does not care which information is selected, assuming that payment is forthcoming. This application is abstractly described by the following code:

Suppose that the program contains endorsements of
some expressions. We wish to qualify the robust declassiﬁcation property to make it insensitive to how these
expressions evaluate. To do this we consider the behavior of the program under an alternate semantics for
endorse expressions, in which the endorse expression evaluates to a nondeterministically chosen new value
val :
M, endorse(e, ) −→ val
Interpreting the endorse statement in this way makes the
evaluation semantics nondeterministic, so it is necessary to
modify the deﬁnitions of conﬁguration indistinguishability
to reﬂect the fact that a given conﬁguration may have multiple traces.
Two trace sets T1 and T2 are indistinguishable up to 
(written T1 ≈ T2 ) if ∀t1 ∈ T1 . ∃t2 ∈ T2 . t1 ≈ t2 &
∀t2 ∈ T2 . ∃t1 ∈ T1 . t1 ≈ t2 , i.e., for any trace from T1 we
can ﬁnd a trace from T2 so that if both terminate than they
are indistinguishable up to  and vice versa. We can now lift
Deﬁnition 2 to multiple-trace semantics:
Definition 8. Two configurations M 1 , c1  and M2 , c2 
are weakly indistinguishable up to  (written M1 , c1  ≈
M2 , c2 ) if Tr (M1 , c1 ) ≈ Tr (M2 , c2 ). We say that
two configurations are strongly indistinguishable up to 
(written M1 , c1   M2 , c2 ) if M1 , c1  ≈ M2 , c2 
and both M 1 , c1  and M2 , c2  always terminate.
Using this notation, the robust declassiﬁcation property
can be qualiﬁed to express the idea that the attacker’s effect
on endorsed expressions does not matter:

[•]; if xLL = 1 then zLH := declassify(yHH , LH )

else zLH := declassify(yHH
, LH )

Definition 9 (Qualified robustness). Command c[•] has
qualiﬁed robustness with respect to fair attacks if

There are two pieces of information available, yHH and

. The purchaser computes the choice in low-integrity
yHH
code •, which sets the variable xLL . The user expects to
receive output on zLH . This code obviously violates robust declassiﬁcation because the “attacks” xLL := 1 and
xLL := 2 release different information, yet the program can
reasonably be considered secure.

∀M1 , M2 , a, a . M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] =⇒
M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ]
Note the similarity of qualiﬁed robustness to the original robustness property from Deﬁnition 6. In fact, the difference
is entirely contained in the generalized indistinguishability
relations A and ≈A .

6.1. Characterizing qualified robustness

6.2. Enforcing qualified robustness

To address this shortcoming, we generalize robust declassiﬁcation to a qualified robustness property in which untrusted code is given a limited ability to affect information
release. This ability is marked explicitly in the code by the
use of a new construct, endorse(e, ). This endorsement
operation has the same result as the expression e but upgrades the integrity of the result, indicating that although
this value might be affected by untrusted code, the real security policy is insensitive to the value.

The use of endorse is governed by the following typing
rule; in addition, attacker code may not use endorse:
Γ, pc  e :    pc  Γ(v) C() = C( )
Γ, pc  v := endorse(e, )
Adding this rule to the type system has no impact on conﬁdentiality when no declassify occurs in a program. To
be more precise, we have the following theorem:
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Theorem 4. If Γ, pc  c and no declassify occurs in c
then for all confidentiality levels C we have
∀M1 , M2 . M1 =(C,I ) M2 =⇒ M1 , c ≈(C,I ) M2 , c
The interesting question is what security assurance is guaranteed in the presence of both declassify
and endorse. The rule above rejects possible misuses of the endorsement mechanism leading to undesired
declassiﬁcation, as illustrated by the following example:
[•]; if xLL then yLH := endorse(zLL , LH )
else skip;
if yLH then vLH := declassify(wHH , LH )
else skip
In this example, the attacker has control over xLL which,
in turn, controls whether the variable zLL is endorsed for
assignment to yLH . It is through the compromise of yLH
that the attacker might cause the declassiﬁcation of wHH .
This program does not satisfy qualiﬁed robustness (take
M1 (wHH ) = 2, M2 (wHH ) = 3, M1 (yLH ) = M2 (yLH ) =
0, M1 (zLL ) = M2 (zLL ) = 1, a = xLL := 0 and
a = xLL := 1 to receive M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] but
M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ]) and is rightfully rejected by
the type system (endorse fails to type check under a lowintegrity pc). In general, we prove that all typable programs
(using the extended type system that includes the rule for
endorse) must satisfy qualiﬁed robustness:
Theorem 5. If Γ, pc  c[•] then c[•] satisfies qualified robust declassification.
A proof is sketched in Appendix B. Below we consider
two examples of typable and, thus, secure programs that involve both declassiﬁcation and endorsement.

The users modify a password:
LH  update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP, hR, mR) :
LH × LH × HL × HL × LH × LH
Under this typing, the above variant of update satisﬁes
qualiﬁed robustness by Theorem 5.

6.4. Battleship game example
The second example is based on the game of Battleship,
an example used by Zheng et al. [46]. Initially, two players place ships on their grid boards in secret. During the
game they try to destroy each other’s ships by ﬁring shots at
locations of the opponent’s grid. On each move the player
making a shot learns whether it hit a ship or not. The game
ends when all squares containing a player’s ships are hit.
It is critical to the security of a battleship implementation
that information is disclosed one location at a time. Because
the locations are initially secret, this disclosure must happen through declassiﬁcation. However, a malicious opponent should not be able to hijack the control over the declassiﬁcation mechanism to cause additional leaks about the secret state of the board. On the other hand, the opponent does
have some control over what is disclosed because the opponent picks the grid location to hit. To allow the opponent to
affect the declassiﬁcation in this way, endorse can be used
to express the idea that any move by the opponent is acceptable.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the game from
the viewpoint of one player only. The security classes can
again be modeled by the simple lattice LLH with A = LL.
Consider the following core fragment of the main battleship
program loop:
while not done do
[•1 ];
m2 := endorse(m2 , LH );
s1 := apply (s1 , m2 );
m1 := get move(s1 );
m1 := declassify(m1 , LH );
not done := declassify(not ﬁnal (s1 ), LH );
[•2 ]

6.3. Password update example revisited
The ﬁrst example is a variant of the password update
code in which the requirement that the old and new passwords have high integrity is explicitly lifted (the assumption, in this case, is that checking the old password provides sufﬁcient integrity assurance). Under the simple lattice LLH :
LH  update(pwdI , salt, oldP , newP, hashR, matchR)
= oldH := endorse(oldP , LH );
newH := endorse(newP , LH );
match(pwdI , salt, oldH , hashR, matchR);
if matchR
then pwdI = hash(newH , salt)
else skip
which enables the following typing for password update:

We suppose that s1 stores the ﬁrst player’s state (the secret
grid and the current knowledge about the opponent) where
Γ(s1 ) ∈ HH . While the game is not ﬁnished the program
gets a move from the opponent, computed in [•1 ] and stored
in m2 where Γ(m2 ) ∈ LL. In order to authorize the opponent to decide what location of s1 to disclose, the move m2
is endorsed in the assignment to m2 where Γ(m2 ) ∈ LH .
The state s1 is updated by a function apply . Then the ﬁrst
player’s move m1 (where Γ(m1 ) ∈ HH ) is computed using the current state. This move includes information about
the location to be disclosed to the attacker. Hence, it is declassiﬁed to variable m1 (where Γ(m1 ) ∈ LH ) before the
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actual disclosure, which takes place in [•2 ]. The information whether the game is ﬁnished (which determines when
to leave the main loop) is public: not done ∈ LH . Hence,
when updating not done, the value of not ﬁnal (s1 ) is
downgraded to LH .
Clearly, this program is typable. Hence, from Theorem 5
we know that no more secret information is revealed than
intended.

7. Related work
Protecting conﬁdential information in computer systems
is an important problem that has been studied from many
angles. This work has focused on language-based security,
which has its roots in Cohen and Denning’s work [7, 9, 11].
See the recent survey by Sabelfeld and Myers [32] for an
overview of the language-based approach.
Related to this paper is Myers’ and Liskov’s work on the
decentralized label model [25], which provides a rich policy
language that includes a notion of ownership of the policy.
Downgrading a principal’s policy requires their authority.
The decentralized label model has been implemented in the
Jif compiler [26]. Work by Zdancewic and Myers [43, 42]
also has similar goals to the work presented here, as discussed in the introduction. The major contribution of this
work is that it connects a semantic security condition for robustness directly to a type-based enforcement mechanism;
this connection has not been previously established.
Giambiagi’s and Dam’s work on admissible flows [8, 15]
takes a similar approach to ours. Their security condition
requires that the implementation reveal no more information than the speciﬁcation of a protocol. This is appealing
but the intended leaks are explicit in the syntax of the speciﬁcation. In our approach, this is not necessary as robustness
is expressed purely in terms of semantics.
The alternate semantics for endorse that are used to deﬁne the qualiﬁed robustness are inspired by the “havoc” semantics that Joshi and Leino used to model conﬁdentiality [18]. They are also similar to some aspects of the generalization of noninterference proposed by Giacobazzi and
Mastroeni [14], based on abstract interpretation; in particular, the abstraction that causes “deceptive” ﬂows to be ignored.
Despite their importance, general downgrading mechanisms and their related security policies are not yet thoroughly understood. Partial information ﬂow policies [7, 18,
35] weaken noninterference by partitioning the domain of
conﬁdential information into subdomains such that noninterference is required only within each subdomain. Quantitative information ﬂow policies [10, 21, 6] restrict the
information-theoretic quantity of downgraded information.
Complexity-theoretic information ﬂow policies [19, 20] facilitate preventing complexity-bound attackers from laun-

dering information through programs that declassify the result of encryption. Approximate noninterference [12] relaxes noninterference by allowing conﬁdential processes to
be (in a probabilistic sense) approximately similar for the
attacker.
Intransitive noninterference policies [31, 27, 30, 22] alter noninterference so that the interference relation is intransitive. Certain information ﬂows are designated as downward and must pass through trusted system components.
The language-based work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [4] similarly allows policies for information released to a set of agents. Mantel and Sands [23] consider
the problem of specifying and enforcing intransitive noninterference in a multi-threaded language-based setting. Such
policies are attractive, but the concept of robustness in this
paper is largely orthogonal to intransitive noninterference
(cf. the discussion on the laundering attack in Section 5),
suggesting that it may be proﬁtable to combine the two approaches.
Volpano and Smith [39] consider a restricted form of declassiﬁcation, in the form of a built in matchh (l) operation,
intended to model the password example. They require h to
be an unmodiﬁable constant when introducing matchh (l),
but this means that password may no be updated. Volpano’s
subsequent work [37] models one-way functions by primitives f (h) and a match-like f (h) = f (h) (where h and r
correspond to the password and user query, respectively),
which are used in a hash-based password checking. The
assumption is however, that one-way functions may not
be applied to modiﬁable secrets. Both studies argue that
one could do updates in an independent program that satisﬁes noninterference. However, in general this opens up
possibilities for laundering attacks. The match, f (h), and
f (h) = f (h) primitives are less general than declassiﬁcation.
Recently, Sabelfeld and Myers have developed a model
for delimited information release [33]. Delimited release allows a program to release information via “escape hatches”.
These escape hatches are represented by expressions that
might legitimately leak sensitive information. Delimited release guarantees that the program may leak no more information than the escape hatch expressions alone.

8. Conclusions
This paper presents a language-based robustness property that characterizes an important aspect of security policies for information release: that information release mechanisms cannot be exploited to release more information than
intended. The language-based security condition generalizes the earlier robustness condition of Zdancewic and Myers [43] expressing the property in a language-based setting: speciﬁcally, for a simple imperative programming lan-
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guage. Second, untrusted code and data are explicitly part
of the system rather than an aspect that appears only when
there is an active attacker. This removes an artiﬁcial modeling limitation of the earlier robustness condition. Third, a
generalized security condition called qualified robustness is
introduced that grants untrusted code a limited ability to affect information release.
The key contribution of the paper is a demonstration
that robustness can be enforced by a compile-time program
analysis based on a simple type system. A type system is
given that tracks data conﬁdentiality and integrity in the imperative programming language, similarly to the type system deﬁned in [42]; this paper takes the new step of proving
that all well-typed programs satisfy a language-based robustness condition. In addition, the analysis is generalized
to accommodate untrusted code that is explicitly permitted
to have a limited effect over information release.
Robust declassiﬁcation appears to be a useful property
for describing a variety of systems. The work was especially
motivated by the work on Jif/split, a system that transforms
programs to run securely on a distributed system [45, 46].
Jif/split automatically splits a sequential program into fragments that it assigns to hosts with sufﬁcient trust levels.
This system maps naturally onto the formal framework described here; holes correspond to low-integrity computation that can be run on untrusted host machines. In general,
being an A-attack (cf. Deﬁnition 7) is required for a program to be placed on an A-trusted host. Thus, the results of
this paper are a promising step toward the goal of establishing the robustness of the Jif/split transformation for the full
Jif/split language.
The security model in this paper assumes, as is common,
a termination-insensitive attacker. However, we anticipate
no major difﬁculties in adapting the robustness model and
the security type system to enforce robust declassiﬁcation
for termination-sensitive attacks. This is a worthwhile direction for future investigations.
Much further work is possible in this area. Although
we have argued that the sequential programming model is
reasonable, and certainly a reasonable starting point, considering the impact of concurrency and concurrent attackers would be an important generalization. Combining robust declassiﬁcation with other security properties related to
downgrading (such as intransitive noninterference) would
also be of interest.
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Appendix A
This appendix presents the proof of the main robustness
result of the paper. If a command c is well-typed under Γ
then it is robust with respect to the attacker-controlled code.
The robustness theorem says that the attacker-controlled
code may not increase the attacker’s observations about the
system. Before proving the theorem, we present a few helpful propositions.
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One such proposition says that if a sequential composition of well-typed commands may not distinguish two lowequivalent memories (through terminating execution), then
the ﬁrst command of the composition may not distinguish
between the memories (which implies that it terminates in
some low-equivalent intermediate memories). Further, the
second command may not distinguish between these intermediate memories. This property is achieved due to the
trace-level granularity of the security condition: the indistinguishability of conﬁgurations requires the indistinguishability of traces (up to high-stuttering).
Proposition 3. If Γ, pc  c 1 ; c2 and M1 , c1 ; c2  A
M2 , c1 ; c2  then M1 , c1  A M2 , c1 . Further, we have
M1 , c1  ⇓ N1 and M2 , c1  ⇓ N2 for some N1 and N2 so
that N1 , c2  A N2 , c2 .
The following proposition relates the executions of two
well-typed programs formed by ﬁlling a target program
with two different attacks. The proposition says that if for
some memory both programs terminate then they agree on
high-integrity data (if the latter exist) at the end of computation. This is a form of noninterference of low-integrity code
with high-integrity values.
Proposition 4. If HI = ∅, Γ, pc  c[•], M, c[a] ⇓ N ,
and M, c[a ] ⇓ N  for some attacks a and a then N (v) =
N  (v) for all v such that Γ(v) ∈ HI .
Suppose we have a typable command and two memories
forming conﬁgurations with this command. The next proposition states that whenever the terminating behaviors of the
conﬁgurations are indistinguishable for the attacker then
no alteration of the attacker-controlled part of the memory may make the behaviors distinguishable for the attacker.
The key idea is that because declassiﬁcation is not allowed
in a low-integrity context, no change of a low-integrity
value at the beginning of computation may reﬂect on lowconﬁdentiality behavior of the computation.
Proposition 5. If Γ, pc  c and M 1 , c A M2 , c for
some M1 and M2 then for any value val and variable v so
that Γ(v) ∈ LI we have M1 , c ≈A M2 , c where M1 =
M1 [v → val ] and M2 = M2 [v → val ].
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3. If Γ, pc  c[•] then c[•] satisfies robust declassification.
Proof. If HI = ∅ then declassiﬁcation is disallowed by
the typing rules, and the theorem follows form Theorem 1.
In the rest of the proof we assume HI = ∅. Induction
on the structure of c[•]. Suppose that for some c[a] and
memories M1 and M2 we have M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a]
(which, in particular, implies M1 =A M2 ). We need to
show M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ] for all a . If c[•] has the

form skip or v := e then the command has no holes, implying c[a] = c[a ], which is a vacuous case. Note that this
case covers (trusted) assignments with declassify in the
right-hand side. The case c[•] = [•] is straightforward because by Proposition 2 attack a satisﬁes noninterference.
Structural cases on c[a] (where appropriate, we assume that
a is split into two vectors a1 and a2 ):
A
c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ] We have M1 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]
M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]. By Proposition 3 we infer
M1 , c1 [a1 ] A M2 , c1 [a1 ]. By the induction hypothesis we obtain M1 , c1 [a1 ] ≈A M2 , c1 [a1 ].
If one, say M1 , c1 [a1 ], of the conﬁgurations diverges then M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ] because
potential computation of c2 [a2 ] in the second conﬁguration may not change the relation. If both conﬁgurations M1 , c1 [a1 ] and M2 , c1 [a1 ] terminate, we
have M2 , c1 [a1 ] ≈A M1 , c1 [a1 ]. Thus, there exist some M1 and M2 so that M1 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ M1 ,
M1 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ M2 , and M1 =A M2 .
Because M1 , c1 [a1 ] A M2 , c1 [a1 ], we have
M1 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ N1 and M2 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ N2 for
some N1 and N2 . Applying Proposition 4 twice,
we have M1 (v) = N1 (v) and M2 (v) = N2 (v)
for all high-integrity variables v. Because
M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] and N1 =A N2 , by Proposition 3 we have N1 , c2 [a2 ] A N2 , c2 [a2 ].
The application of Proposition 5 yields
M1 , c2 [a2 ] ≈A M2 , c2 [a2 ] By the induction hypothesis we have M1 , c2 [a2 ] ≈A M2 , c2 [a2 ].
Connecting the traces for c1 and c2 , we receive
M1 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ] ≈A M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ].
if b then c1 [a1 ] else c2 [a2 ] If Vars(b) ⊆ LC then
b evaluates to the same value, say true, under
both M1 and M2 , i.e., the execution of the conditional reduces to the same branch in both memories. We have M1 , c[a] −→ M1 , c1 [a1 ]
and M2 , c[a] −→ M2 , c1 [a1 ] as well as
M1 , c[a ] −→ M1 , c1 [a1 ] and M2 , c[a ] −→
M2 , c1 [a1 ]. As M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] we have
M1 , c1 [a1 ] A M2 , c1 [a1 ]. By the induction hypothesis M1 , c1 [a1 ] ≈A M2 , c1 [a1 ]. This implies
M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ].
If Vars(b) ⊆ LC , i.e., a high-conﬁdentiality variable occurs in b, then we observe that there are no holes
in the program, implying c[a] = c[a ], which is a vacuous case.
while b do c1 [a] The case when Vars(b) ⊆ LC is handled
in the same way as for conditionals. If Vars(b) ⊆ HI
then no declassiﬁcation may occur in while b do c1 [a ]
by the deﬁnition of the type system and attacks. By
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Theorem 1, the proof is while b do c1 [a ] satisﬁes noninterference, which completes the proof. The remaining case is Vars(b) ⊆ LC ∩ HI . Expression b evaluates to the same value under both M1 and M2 . If this
value is false then both M1 , c[a ] and M2 , c[a ] terminate in one step with no change to the memories M1
and M2 , yielding M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ].
If, on the other hand, the value of b is true then for
M1 , while b do c1 [a] A M2 , while b do c1 [a]
it is necessary that M1 , c1 [a] A M2 , c1 [a]. By
the induction hypothesis, we have M1 , c1 [a ] ≈A
M2 , c1 [a ]. If either M1 , c1 [a ] or M2 , c1 [a ] diverges then the top-level loop also diverges under M1
(or M2 ), implying M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ]. If both
conﬁgurations terminate, then there exist some M1 and
M2 so that M1 , c1 [a ] ⇓ M1 , M2 , c1 [a ] ⇓ M2 , and
M1 =A M2 . Note that the value of b is the same under M1 and M2 . If this value is false then the proof
is ﬁnished. Otherwise, we need to further unwind the
loop.
Applying Proposition 4 twice, we infer
M1 , c1 [a] ⇓ N1 and M2 , c1 [a] ⇓ N2 for some N1
and N2 so that M1 (v) = N1 (v) and M2 (v) = N2 (v)
for all high-integrity variables v. This, in particular, implies that b evaluates to true in both N1 and
N2 .
Because M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a] and N1 =A N2 ,
by Proposition 3 we have M1 , c1 [a] A M2 , c1 [a]
and therefore N1 , c[a] A N2 , c[a] (because c[a]
corresponds to unwinding the loop).
Note that we have mimicked a c[a] iteration by a
c[a ] iteration (with the possibility that the latter might
diverge due to an internal loop caused by low-integrity
computation). During this iteration we have preserved
the invariant that the executions for both M1 and M2
give low-conﬁdentiality indistinguishable traces (for
each c1 [a] and c1 [a ]), and low-conﬁdentiality highintegrity data in the ﬁnal states of all traces is the same
regardless of the memory (M1 or M2 ) and the command (c1 [a] or c1 [a ]). By ﬁnitely repeating this construction (with the possibility of ﬁnishing the proof at
each step due to an internal loop of c1 [a ]), we reach
the state when b evaluates to false, which corresponds
to the termination of the top-level loop for both c1 [a]
and c1 [a ]. That M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ] we receive
by concatenating low-assignment traces from each iteration.

Appendix B
This appendix extends the proof of robustness to show
that the type system with the rule for endorse guarantees qualiﬁed robustness. The proof structure is as in Ap-

pendix A. We lift the proof technique to a possibilistic setting by reasoning about the existence of individual traces
that originate from a given conﬁguration and possess desired properties. In parentheses, we provide references to
the respective propositions and deﬁnitions for the nonqualiﬁed version of robustness.
Proposition 6 (2). An A-attack under Γ (i) does not
have occurrences of assignments to high-integrity variables (such v that Γ(v) ∈ H I ); and (ii) satisfies (possibilistic) noninterference under Γ.
Proposition 7 (3). If Γ, pc

c 1 ; c2 and
M1 , c1 ; c2  A M2 , c1 ; c2  then M1 , c1  A M2 , c1 .
If t1 ∈ Tr (M1 , c1 ) (assuming t1 terminates in N1 ) and
t2 ∈ Tr (M2 , c1 ) (assuming t2 terminates in N2 ) so that
t1 ≈A t2 then N1 , c2  A N2 , c2 .
Proposition 8 (4). If H I = ∅ and Γ, pc  c[•] for attacks
a and a so that and M, c[a] always terminates then for
any t ∈ Tr (M, c[a ]) so that t terminates there exists
t ∈ Tr (M, c[a]) so that t ∼ t for all such  that  ∈ HI .
Proposition 9 (5). If Γ, pc  c and M 1 , c A M2 , c
for some M1 and M2 then for any value val and variable
v so that Γ(v) ∈ LI we have M1 , c ≈A M2 , c where
M1 = M1 [v → val ] and M2 = M2 [v → val ].
Theorem 5. If Γ, pc  c[•] then c[•] satisfies qualified robust declassification.
Proof. If HI = ∅ then declassiﬁcation is disallowed by
the typing rules, and the theorem follows form Theorem 4.
In the rest of the proof we assume HI = ∅. Induction
on the structure of c[•]. Suppose that for some c[a] and
memories M1 and M2 we have M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a]
(which, in particular, implies M1 =A M2 ). We need to
show M1 , c[a ] ≈A M2 , c[a ] for all a . If c[•] has the
form skip or v := e then the command has no holes,
implying c[a] = c[a ], which is a vacuous case because
A ⊆ ≈A . Note that this case covers (trusted) assignments
with declassify and endorse in the right-hand side. The
case c[•] = [•] is straightforward because by Proposition 6
attack a satisﬁes noninterference.
Considering structural cases on c[•], the most interesting
case is sequential composition: c[•] = c1 [•1 ]; c2 [•2 ] where
the vector • is split into two vectors •1 and •2 . We only
show this case as the rest of the cases can be reconstructed
straightforwardly from the proof of Theorem 3.
The premise of the theorem states that
A
M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ].
M1 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]
We need to show M1 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]
≈A
M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ],
i.e.,
by
unfolding
Deﬁnition 8, ∀t1
∈
Tr (M1 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]). ∃t2
∈


Tr (M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]). t1 ≈A t2 along with the symmetric condition where M1 and M2 are swapped (which is
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proved analogously). We assume that t1 terminates (otherwise the case is vacuous).
Suppose t1 = t1 t1 where t1 ∈ Tr (M1 , c1 [a1 ]),
M1 , c1 [a1 ] terminates with t1 in some state M1 , and
t1 ∈ Tr (M1 , c2 [a2 ]). By Proposition 7 we deduce
M1 , c1 [a1 ] A M2 , c1 [a1 ]. By the induction hypothesis we obtain M1 , c1 [a1 ] ≈A M2 , c1 [a1 ]. In particular,
∃t2 ∈ Tr (M2 , c1 [a1 ]). t1 ≈A t2 .
If t2 diverges, then we have found the necessary t2 (it
is simply t2 ) to ﬁnish the proof. In the remaining case both
traces t1 and t2 terminate and t1 ∼A t2 . This means that
there exist some M1 and M2 so that M1 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ M1 ,
corresponding to trace t1 , M1 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ M2 , corresponding to trace t2 , and M1 =A M2 .
Applying Proposition 8 twice, there exist
u1 ∈ Tr (M1 , c[a]) and u2 ∈ Tr (M2 , c[a]) where
t1 ∼ u1 and t2 ∼ u2 for all such  that  ∈ HI . This
leads to u1 ∼A u2 . We assume M1 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ N1 , corresponding to trace u1 and M2 , c1 [a1 ] ⇓ N2 , corresponding
to trace u2 , for some N1 and N2 .
As u1 ≈A u2 and M1 , c[a] A M2 , c[a]
we have N1 , c2 [a2 ] A N2 , c2 [a2 ] by Proposition 7. The application of Proposition 9 yields
M1 , c2 [a2 ] ≈A M2 , c2 [a2 ] By the induction hypothesis we have M1 , c2 [a2 ] ≈A
M2 , c2 [a2 ].
Connecting the traces for c1 and c2 , we construct
t2 ∈ Tr (M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ]) such that t1 ≈A t2 , implying M1 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ] ≈A M2 , c1 [a1 ]; c2 [a2 ].
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